Department of Labor and Industry Board of Personnel Appeals PO Box 201503 Helena, MT 59620-1503 (406) 444-2718

STATE OF MONTANA BEFORE THE BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGE NO. 27-2010

BRADFORD L. WILSON, Complainant, -vs- PARK COUNTY AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL NO. 2, Defendants,	INVESTIGATIVE REPORT AND OTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS
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I. Introduction

On February 11, 2010, Bradford Wilson filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board of Personnel Appeals against Park County, hereinafter the County. The charge was also filed against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 2, hereinafter Local 2, or Union. The complaint alleges that the County failed to bargain in good faith with Local 2, a violation of 39-31-401(5) MCA and that Local 2 in turn failed to bargain in good faith with the County, a violation of 39-31-402(2) MCA. Mr. Wilson further alleges that the County and the Union both violated 39-31-305(1) and (2) MCA in that they "were negligent in their duties to bargain in good faith", the end result of which was a reduction in the gross hourly wage paid to Mr. Wilson.

Park County, through both its County Attorney and its chosen bargaining representative, as well as the Union through it Business Representative Jim Stone have responded to the charge and have denied any violation of Montana law.

On April 12, 2010, Mr. Wilson filed an amendment to the original charge restating the original complaint and providing additional information and narrative as well.

Park County responded to the amended complaint on April 28, 2010, again denying that it had committed an unfair labor practice. Local 2 elected to not file a written answer to the amended complaint, but in telephone conversation with the investigator Mr. Stone denied that the Union had committed an unfair labor practice. Mr. Wilson was afforded until May 7, 2010, to submit any further information or argument in support of his position and he did so in a timely manner.

John Andrew was assigned by the Board to investigate the charge and amended charge and has reviewed the information submitted by the parties and communicated with them as necessary in the course of the investigation.

II. Findings and Discussion

Mr. Wilson contends that the violation in question occurred during a July 2009 bargaining session between the County and Local 2. Prior to addressing the session however, certain background information is necessary.

Bradford Wilson began working as an operating engineer in the Park County Road and Bridge Department on September 27, 2004. The Road and Bridge Department was not unionized at the time Mr. Wilson was hired so Mr. Wilson was subject to the general Park County Personnel Policy and Procedures Handbook which classified him as a Grade 14 Operating Engineer. The handbook Mr. Wilson supplied along with his complaint was effective 9/20/04 and, according to Mr. Wilson, was superseded 11/6/07. The 04 version also lists a Road and Bridge Assistant Road Supervisor as a Grade 14 and a Road and Bridge Supervisor as Grade 16. No pay rates are assigned to the grade levels listed in the handbook.

On January 1, 2006, Mr. Wilson, in the words of his complaint "accepted a lateral position to Assistant Road Supervisor Grade 14". The paperwork capturing this event – an employee status change form - was submitted to, and approved by the county commissioners with a retroactive date of January 21, 2006. As part of this change Mr. Wilson's hourly wage was increased from \$14.57 to \$15.82, part of which was a scheduled increase and part of which reflected Mr. Wilson's new title and responsibilities. The status form actually reflects the change as "promoted to assistant road supervisor". The salient fact is that Mr. Wilson saw an increase in his pay directly attributable to his new title and responsibilities. There is no reason offered, nor can one be discerned, as to why Mr. Wilson did not recognize the pay increase as attributable, at least in part, to his new title and responsibilities.

On February 3, 2008, Bradford Wilson wrote to his supervisor and the commissioners:

I am requesting that I be laterally transferred to Operating Engineer within the Park County Road Department. I would like to take this time to thank each of you for the opportunity to have served as the Assistant Road Supervisor. I feel that I am much better suited to be in the field working and am a bigger asset to the county as such.

There was no decrease in Mr. Wilson's rate of pay as a result of this change in job title.

In the spring of 2008, the County became aware of organizing efforts in the Road and Bridge Department. That belief was verified when on June 10, 2008, Local 2 filed a petition for a new unit determination with the Board of Personnel Appeals. The Board conducted an election and on August 11, 2008, certified Local 2 as the exclusive

 bargaining representative for employees in the Park County Road and Bridge Department.

Bargaining ensued between the County and the Union with Jim Stone, Business Representative for Local 2 as prime representative for the Union and Rick D'Hooge being the designated representative of the County.

As the parties sat down to discuss wages a spreadsheet was created by the County showing the wages paid to employees in the Road and Bridge Department. This is a natural occurrence in any bargaining process, and particularly so in this case where the County and the exclusive representative of the employees are bargaining their initial contract. Logically, you can't bargain wages until you know what everyone in the bargaining unit is paid. It was during the course of this that the County discovered an anomaly, namely that Mr. Wilson was receiving pay reflecting Assistant Road Supervisor responsibilities, not Operator pay.

Upon learning of the discrepancy Mr. D'Hooge broached the issue with the Union at a July 14, 2009, bargaining session. Present at the table were Rick D'Hooge, Jim Stone, Jill-Ann Oullette, County Human Resource Analyst, Ed Hillman, the Road and Bridge Department Supervisor, and Mark Smith, Union Steward. Mr. D'Hooge advised the Union that there was an issue with Mr. Wilson receiving Assistant Road Supervisor pay when he was no longer in that position and had, in fact, resigned from those duties (laterally transferred in Mr. Wilson's words) in February of 2008. Mr. D'Hooge further advised the Union that the County did intend to correct the error in pay, but it did not intend to do so retroactively. Mr. Stone advised the County that he would confer with Mr. Wilson about the situation and then get back to the County.

On or about July 16, Jim Stone did talk by phone with Bradford Wilson. From that conversation, and although the substance of it may be at issue between Mr. Stone and Mr. Wilson, flowed agreement between the Union and the County that Mr. Wilson's wage be decreased to reflect Operator's pay and not Assistant Supervisor pay. With the consent of the exclusive bargaining agent the County initiated the necessary paperwork and reduced Mr. Wilson's hourly rate from \$18.93 per hour to \$18.37 per hour, the amount paid to similarly situated Operators. The County did not directly advise Mr. Wilson of this change as the County believed that doing so could be construed as bypassing the exclusive bargaining representative, an unfair labor practice. Also, the County understandably believed that Mr. Wilson was already notified, as he had been, that a reduction in pay was imminent. Ultimately when Mr. Wilson received an August paycheck with the reduced rate he did file what he termed a grievance with the County. Upon receiving no satisfaction through that route Mr. Wilson then filed a wage complaint with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry on December 17, 2009, the file on which this investigator has taken administrative notice.

Mr. Wilson's wage claim recites his view of the factual background and contends in part:

On July 16, 2009, I received a call at my residence from Jim Stone, Business Representative for Teamsters Local #2, who is presently representing R&BD in labor negotiations with Park County. Mr. Stone informed me that a wage reduction of \$0.50 per hour might be forthcoming sometime in August. Mr. Stone stated that the reduction was due to my lack of decision-making in the field. I expressed concern to Mr. Stone about the legality of the reduction and the ambiguity of the reason given.

Then, consistent with his unfair labor practice complaint, Mr. Wilson proceeds to aver:

. . .the legal responsibility to notify the claimant [of a reduction in wages] belongs to Park County and not Teamsters Local #2

<u>Klein v. Department of Corrections</u>, 185 P.3d 986 is cited as authority for this proposition as is 39-31-306 MCA requiring that collective bargaining agreements be reduced to writing, a contributing factor to the belief of Mr. Wilson that the provisions of 39-3-203 MCA were not followed by the Park County.

The above findings and contentions in mind, and with the further contention of Mr. Wilson that the County and the Union bargained in bad faith with one another to his detriment also in mind, the one thing crystal clear to the investigator is the fact that neither the County nor the Union have accused one another of bad faith bargaining. In fact, they believe that they met their mutual bargaining obligations to one another as required under the Collective Bargaining Act for Public Employees, 39-31-101 et seq. MCA.

The bargaining between the County and the exclusive bargaining representative, Local 2 is just that, a bargain between the public employer and the union. Ultimately, any contract that might be reached between the County and the Local 2 is also just that - an agreement between the parties to the agreement – Local 2, the exclusive bargaining representative and Park County. Arguendo, the unfair labor practice charge of Mr. Wilson is incorrectly filed by an individual who does not have standing to question whether or not the parties to the contract did or did not bargain in good faith with one another. On its face the unfair labor practice complaint could be dismissed, but that issue is not raised by the parties so the investigator will not recommend dismissal of this solely on that basis alone. Rather, and because the County, through its chosen bargaining representative has raised a question of possibly conflicting statutes, the other elements of the complaint will be addressed in hopes of further carrying out the purpose of the collective bargaining act, namely to "encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining to arrive at friendly adjustment of all disputes between public employers and their public employees", 39-31-101 MCA. Further, although not precisely stated, Mr. Wilson's complaint could also be construed as raising the issue of whether the Union fairly represented him in this matter.

At the onset, had Mr. Wilson's hourly rate been reduced in February 2008 to reflect his resignation from the Assistant Road Supervisor position it is unlikely that this unfair labor practice charge would have been filed, nor would the wage claim against the

County have been filed. It is only reasonable to conclude (and as actually happened) that an increase in responsibilities from Operator to Assistant Road Supervisor resulted in additional compensation for Mr. Wilson. So too, it is only reasonable to conclude that a reduction in responsibilities, absent some clear, explicit agreement to the contrary, would result in a decrease in pay for Mr. Wilson. It simply is not reasonable to define what occurred as being "laterally transferred" as Mr. Wilson contends. Granted, both job titles were in the same grade in the County handbook, but that does not mean the same compensation applied to the two job titles. The proof of that rests in the simple fact that Mr. Wilson's hourly rate increased when he became Assistant Road Supervisor. Logical consistency says that his pay should have decreased when he resigned/laterally transferred from the same position. That did not happen and considering all that has been presented to the investigator what occurred is best described as administrative error on the part of the County, perhaps attributable to change in personnel and perhaps in some way attributable to some question on the part of the County as to how best to fill a vacant Road Supervisor position. Mr. Wilson's contentions and argument to the contrary, nothing presented to the investigator clearly establishes a knowing and informed decision on the part of the County to maintain Mr. Wilson's pay at the Assistant Road Supervisor rate. To the contrary, a more compelling explanation is that maintenance of Mr. Wilson's pay at the higher rate was simply a mistake. Whatever the case, the error in not addressing the resignation manifested itself in a different form with the involvement of the Union. No longer could the County unilaterally make a change in wages absent the involvement of the Union and the County did what was legally required of it to implement the change in pay.

The Montana Supreme Court has approved the practice of the Board of Personnel Appeals in using Federal Court and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent as guidelines in interpreting the Montana Collective Bargaining for Public Employees Act, State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals vs. District Court, 183 Montana 223 598 P.2d 1117, 103 LRRM 2297; Teamsters Local No. 45 vs. State ex rel. Board of Personnel Appeals, 185 Montana 272, 635 P.2d 185, 119 LRRM 2682; and AFSCME Local No. 2390 vs. City of Billings, Montana 555 P.2d 507, 93 LRRM 2753. To the extent cited in this decision, federal precedent is considered applicable.

It is well settled on the federal level that a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining – wages, hours, fringe benefits and other conditions of employment - is an unfair labor practice and a per se failure to bargain in good faith, NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 50 LRRM 2177, (1962). The rationale used in Katz has been adopted by the Board of Personnel Appeals in numerous cases and has been most recently affirmed in Bonner School District No. 14 vs. Bonner Education Association, 208 MT 9 (2008). Absent impasse, unilateral changes cannot be made in mandatory subjects of bargaining other than in very limited circumstances, none of which apply in the instant case. Additionally, there is an ongoing obligation on the part of the employer to maintain the status quo vis-à-vis mandatory subjects of bargaining not only during bargaining, but also during the period of time when employees are engaged in other protected, concerted activities, such as forming a union. Of further importance, direct dealing with an individual member of a bargaining unit rather than with the exclusive bargaining representative, either in the formative phases of the unit, or after recognition

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or Board certification, constitutes an unfair labor practice. See for instance, ULP 3-2001, Firefighters Local No. 8 v City of Great Falls, General Electric Co. 150 NLRB 192, cert. denied 397 U.S. 965, 73 LRRM 2600 (1970), and Medo Photo Supply Corp v NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 14 LRRM 581 (1944). In short, there were valid, legal reasons why the County discussed the wage reduction issue with the Union before implementing the change which was ultimately made with the consent of the Union. There were valid, legal reasons why the County did not approach Mr. Wilson directly about the changes once the Union was on the scene. There were valid, legal reasons why the County did not discuss the changes directly with Mr. Wilson when the Union was on the scene, and there were valid, legal reasons why the County stepped back and recognized the actions taken by the Union in dealing with the bargaining unit member as appropriate notice of the change in wages. Contrary to the assertion of Mr. Wilson, the County followed legal obligations placed on public employers by applicable Montana law. The County followed the law it deemed most applicable to the situation, and to the extent there may be any conflict in 39-3-203, or for that matter whether Mr. Wilson even properly asserted his rights under 39-3-203, the more specific bargaining obligations are controlling in terms of the process that was used to implement the change in a mandatory subject of bargaining.

If error exists in this case it properly rests with the County for not correcting the change in Mr. Wilson's pay and classification in February of 2008. Mr. Wilson, to some degree arguably contributed to that error by not bringing the situation to the attention of the County. This is not to say Mr. Wilson was in error, but to some degree the fact that he returned to the field yet retained his pay must have struck somewhat of an odd note absent some mutual agreement to the contrary, none of which has been demonstrated.

Again there is serious doubt whether Mr. Wilson has standing to bring the charge he has leveled against Local 2. However, in construing his charge in the broadest light, the investigator believes that Local 2 has carried out its legal responsibilities to Mr. Wilson. The delay in implementing the reduction in pay after Mr. Wilson's resignation from Assistant Road Supervisor was no fault of the Union. Then when the Union was fully engaged in concerted activities, including bargaining, the Union carried out its legal responsibilities to Mr. Wilson. Whether or not Mr. Stone got, or for that matter was given, the precise details of when the reduction would occur, job titles, promotion dates, and the precise amount of the reduction has to give way to the fact that regardless of Mr. Wilson's strained construction of being "laterally transferred" he was fully compensated the wages due an Operator - his correct classification since February of 2008. Very arguably, the status quo Mr. Wilson now seeks to maintain, in fact, should have been the status quo - Operators' pay - at the time he submitted his resignation from Assistant Road Supervisor. To do otherwise not only perpetuates an error, but it creates what could no doubt be perceived as pay inequities by other Operators in the bargaining unit. Local 2 fulfilled its bargaining obligation to Mr. Wilson, the County and for that matter, the bargaining unit as a whole.

Park County and Local 2 lived up to their responsibilities to one another under the collective bargaining statutes. Once an understanding was reached that the wage reduction would occur, the question of whether or not there was an additional, or

continuing responsibility on the part of the employer, working in concert with the Union, to notify Mr. Wilson of the specifics of that reduction and its effective date, is not a matter for the Board of Personnel Appeals to decide. The responsibility of the Board is to determine whether or not there is probable merit to the charge that the Union and/or the County committed an unfair labor practice. In the view of the investigator there is not substantial evidence to sustain a finding of probable merit that either the Union or the County engaged in bad faith bargaining or that in the case of the Union, it did not fulfill its responsibilities to Mr. Wilson. Could both the Union and the County have done a more thorough job in notifying Mr. Wilson? Yes, but in what they did, there is no basis for sustaining an unfair labor practice charge.

III. Recommended Order

It is hereby recommended that Unfair Labor Practice Charge 27-2010 be dismissed as without probable merit.

DATED this 20th day of May 2010.

BOARD OF PERSONNEL APPEALS

By: _____ John Andrew Investigator

NOTICE

Pursuant to 39-31-405 (2) MCA, if a finding of no probable merit is made by an agent of the Board a Notice of Intent to Dismiss is to be issued. The Notice of Intent to Dismiss may be appealed to the Board. The appeal must be in writing and must be made within 10 days of receipt of the Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The appeal is to be filed with the Board at P.O. 201503, Helena, MT 59620-1503. If an appeal is not filed the decision to dismiss becomes a final order of the Board.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING	
I,, do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of this document was mailed to the following on the day of 2010, postage paid and addressed as follows:	_
BRADFORD WILSON PO BOX 77 WILSALL MT 59086	
BRETT LINNEWEBER PARK COUNTY ATTORNEY 414 EAST CALLENDAR LIVINGSTON MT 59047	
JIM STONE TEAMSTERS LOCAL NO. 2 PO BOX 2648 GREAT FALLS MT 59403	